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Abstract—The shift from mere service-oriented architectures
(SOA) to semantically enriched approaches is especially being
forced in multi-domain environments that the public sector in the
European Union is an example for. The security aspect is lagging
behind its possibilities, and new access control approaches native
to the semantic environment need to be applied. Based on archi-
tectural research work conducted within the EU-funded research
project Access-eGov, we outline our implementation of a semantic
security architecture for web services by using industry-standard
technologies and combining them with semantic enhancements.
Index Terms—XACML, semantic security infrastructure, eGov
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, public administrations all over the world are
being confronted with the ever growing challenge to deliver
their services electronically and, especially in the European
Union, are required by the so-called Services Directive[1] to
do this across their own legal boundaries.
Challenges to this vision mainly arise from the semantic gap
between the service descriptions, resulting in high entry thresh-
olds to implement those collaborative systems. In enabling
semantically enriched service-oriented architectures (SSOA),
Access-eGov saw its main field of research.
Restricting access to valuable service resources only after
trustful authorization was seen as a crucial part to heighten the
overall security of the semantic service-oriented system and the
reliability in general [2]. Our semantic security architecture for
service-oriented systems based on the attribute-based access
control paradigm [3] has already been described in [4], [5],
[6] and has now successfully been implemented.
In the following chapters, we describe the technological
building blocks for implementing authorization and access
control in service-oriented architectures and also introduce
the related key technologies that already exist in this field
of research (chapter II). Chapter III gives an overview of
our approach to securing a service-oriented architecture and
shows architectural alternatives how to introduce semantically-
enabled access authorization here. Selected aspects of the
respective implementation are being described in chapter IV,
before desirable future research activities in this field are being
summed up in chapter V.
II. BUILDING BLOCKS AND RELATED WORK
A. Security Building Blocks
The security architecture for the Access-eGov project does
not aim at inventing new authentication and authorization
standards and protocols. Instead, our security infrastructure is
based on a number of existing and proven standards. However,
no single standard allows realizing the security infrastructure
as intended as each one is focused on a very specific function.
In the following we therefore shortly lay out the basic technical
principles.
1) WS-Security: WS-Security [7] is an open standard that
specifies how security related meta-data should be incorporated
into SOAP messages. WS-Security does however not define
security models, mechanisms or technologies but rather defines
how existing approaches should be applied to SOAP messages
to ensure interoperability among different implementations and
languages. For that purpose WS-Security defines several basic
elements for the SOAP headers to hold security information.
Several additional profiles for security tokens have been
specified so far, such as the UsernameToken Profile [8], or
the X.509Token Profile [9]. For the security infrastructure of
Access-eGov the SAMLToken Profile [10] is the most relevant
one as it allows integrating SAML assertions in the SOAP
header. The WS-Security standard and its token profiles are
currently supported by several web service frameworks such
as Apache Axis 2 and its security module Rampart, Sun Metro
and its security component WSIT or Apache CXF.
2) SAML: The Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML) [11] is an extensible XML-based specification stan-
dardized by the OASIS to exchange authentication and au-
thorization data between identity providers (IdP) and service
providers (SP). SAML is used in many SSO projects such as
the Shibboleth project or the Liberty Alliance and is therefore
our choice. For exchanging information, SAML defines a
number of request/response protocols and the data type of
SAML Assertions. A SAML Assertion is information container
which can carry one or several SAML Statements about a
subject, typically a user. SAML Assertions are issued by SAML
authorities, e.g. a user’s IdP, and are used by SPs to grant or
reject access to protected resources based on the contained
statements. Due to the available extension library to support
the SAML profile for XACML (see section II-A4) we decided
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to build our security architecture based on OpenSAML1.
3) XACML & WS-XACML: Before even being able to
pass security tokens around, the system needs to arrive at
an access control decision first. For this purpose our security
infrastructure roughly follows the XACML specification [12].
The XACML specification is an OASIS standard which
basically comprises a XML-based access control policy lan-
guage and a architecture recommendation for authorization
infrastructures. Specifically, the XACML architecture specifies
the implementation of a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), a
Policy Administration Point (PAP), a Policy Decision Point
(PDP), a Policy Information Point (PIP), and a Context Handler.
Each of these actors is devoted to one specific task in the access
control process.
The Web Service Profile of XACML (WS-XACML) [13]
specification defines means for the application of XACML
in a SOA. While WS-Security (see section II-A1) defines
how several kinds of security tokens should be integrated into
SOAP messages, WS-XACML specifies one of these tokens,
the Authorization Token, in more detail. The Authorization
Token allows transferring an access decision between PDP and
PEP. This enables the PDP as a trusted third party to make
access decisions on behalf of the SP.
Currently available implementations of the XACML specifi-
cation are for example OpenXACML2, enterprise-java-xacml
from Google code3, HERAS XACML4, JBoss XACML5, and
Sun’s XACML6. At the time we started implementation we
selected Sun’s XACML implementation as it was the most
mature one available.
4) SAML Profile for XACML: Neither XACML nor WS-
XACML specify a messaging protocol for communication
between the different nodes of the architecture but rather rely
on SAML to transfer the specified security information. The
SAML 2.0 profile for XACML v2.0 [14] bridges the gap
between SAML and XACML. It clearly specifies how XACML
messages are to be transfered via the SAML protocol and how
XACML attributes are represented in SAML.
At the time we started implementing the security infras-
tructure, the SAML profile for XACML was implemented by
the ”OpenSAML2.0 Extension Library to Support SAML2.0
profile of XACML2.0”7 and integrated well with OpenSAML.
In the meantime it is already fully integrated into OpenSAML.
5) WS-Security SAML Token Profile: The last missing piece
for implementing our security infrastructure is the WS-Security
SAML Token Profile. SAML assertions can be used within
SOAP messages to carry authentication and authorization
information [15]. Although WS-Security defines a security
header for SOAP messages to hold such data, it does not
define its format and structure. This profile therefore clearly
1http://www.opensaml.org
2http://www.openxacml.org
3http://code.google.com/p/enterprise-java-xacml
4http://www.herasaf.org/components/xacml-implementation.html
5http://www.jboss.org/jbosssecurity/downloads/JBoss\%20XACML/
6http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net
7http://www.bccs.uib.no/∼hakont/SAMLXACMLExtension
defines how SAML assertions should be used for this purpose
with the WS-Security framework to avoid incompatibilities
between different implementations.
B. Semantic Building Blocks
Semantic SOAs need a sophisticated back end, mainly
consisting of an entity representing world, domain, and web
service specific knowledge (usually an ontology), a language for
serializing this knowledge for different on-the-wire protocols,
and an associated set of components and tools to query, store
and transform it. In our approach we use the Web Service
Modeling Ontology (WSMO) [16], the Web Service Modeling
Language (WSML) [17] and an adopted and extended version
of the accompanying tool set:
1) Web Service Modeling Ontology: In sharp contrast to
other approaches such as OWL-S [18], the WSMO development
team chose not to rely on existing technology but started the
development of an ontology for semantic web services from
scratch, creating an attractive conceptual model with only four
main elements: Ontology, Web Service, Goal and Mediator.
2) Web Service Modeling Language (WSML): WSMO
constructs are formalized into WSML, a XML-based language
that is available in four variants with differing degrees of
complexity and different logic formalism roots.
3) SAWSDL: A web service grounding describes the actual
web service endpoints, protocols, and the messages exchanged
to use them. Conventional SOAs keep this information in plain
WSDL documents which have to be prepared for usage in
semantically enhanced scenarios. Of the approaches explained
in [19], we chose the backward compatible SAWSDL [20]
approach for its flexibility and simplicity. One element, the
model reference, links functions of a web service (described in
WSDL) to their semantic representation. Elements for lifting
and lowering, the processes of transforming data from the
low-level web service to the semantic world and vice versa,
complete the necessary information and allow direct execution
of a conventional web service. Currently the method of choice
for lifting and lowering translations is to use XSLT where
possible to quickly define effective transformation rules.
4) Additional Components: In order to employ our security
infrastructure, we need to first encode the security services
into WSMO entities. A web service instance that offers the
capability authentication has to be annotated with this capability
via a user interface. Web services in need of authentication need
to be annotated with a complementary goal of the same name.
A resolver component is used to find those services capable
of fulfilling a specific goal. Execution of those services is
triggered and monitored by an invoker component.
5) Process Model: The original WSMO process model is
based on abstract state machines. For a number of reasons
given in [21] and [6] however, Access-eGov has defined its
own process model. It builds upon a hierarchical organization
of life events, associated goals and sub-goals and a rule-based
way of describing the interfaces.
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III. A SEMANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR WEB
SERVICES
First ideas and the preliminary overall architecture of our
security infrastructure for Access-eGov have already been
presented in [4] and [5]. Similar approaches have as well
been identified by [22], [23], [24]. Therefore, this section
focuses on the differences and adoptions we performed for
real-world deployment. The presented architecture and data
flow implement all requirements gathered in [25], [26], [2].
The XACML standard defines a basic authorization in-
frastructure that is generic enough to implement the ABAC
authorization model as proposed in the Access-eGov project.
We therefore based our security infrastructure (see Fig. 1) on
the XACML approach (see section II-A3).
A. Building Blocks and Data Flow
The Access Requester is the central component of our
security infrastructure (see Fig. 1). In our scenario the user
interacts with the Access-eGov portal via a web browser (step
0). Therefore the Access Requester is implemented as part
of the Access-eGov portal and acts on behalf of the user.
To interact with the Access-eGov portal, a user has to be
authenticated. The focus of this paper however is on the
authorization process. We therefore presume successful user
authentication which can easily be handled by many widespread
authentication mechanisms [27]. In (1) the Access Requester
retrieves the access policy of the resource from the PAP by
sending a XACMLPolicyQuery to the PAP.
The PAP returns the requested policy within a
XACMLPolicyStatement (2) from which the Access
Requester in turn retrieves all sets of user attributes which
potentially result in a positive authorization decision.
In (3) the Access Requester retrieves the user attribute values
for one of the attribute sets of (2) via a SAMLAttribute-
Query from the PIP. The PIP is the source of all kinds of
attributes. Our architecture does not imply a single, central PIP
but allows for different PIPs for different kinds of attributes.
We suggest to have a dedicated PIP for user attributes as
they are considered especially worth protecting. Retrieval of
user attributes from the PIP is protected and likewise requires
authorization. This is out of scope for this paper but [28] for
example presents a recursive approach to use XACML for this
kind of authorization as well.
As the PIP and the SP may employ different attribute naming
schemes, not all requested attributes may be known to the
PIP. Therefore the PIP optionally sends a list of unknown
attribute identifiers to the Inference Engine (4). The OAP is an
optional component that manages all ontologies employed
by the different SPs within the Access-eGov system and
keeps them ready for the Inference Engine. The Inference
Engine retrieves the ontologies used by the PIP and the SP
respectively from the OAP and mediates between different
attribute identifiers. In (5) it returns a list of alternative user
attribute identifiers which are known to the PIP and semantically
identical to the ones requested in the access policy of the
resource. Finally, the PIP returns the requested user attributes
within a SAMLAttributeStatement (6) to the Access
Requester. In case the PIP does not return attribute values for
all requested user attributes (some of them may be unknown),
the Access Requester repeats (3) with a different attribute set.
In step (7) the Access Requester optionally employs a
PDPSelector. The PDPSelector is not defined in the XACML
standard and is an optional component of our security infras-
tructure. Users have to make available their attributes to the
PDP to access restricted resources but might as well restrict
disclosure of their attributes to selected PDPs. The PDPSelector
is in charge of discovering a PDP that both, the user and the
SP, have trust in and return it in (8) to the Access Requester.
As the Access Requester now gathered all required
user attribute values and an applicable PDP, it retrieves
an authorization decision from the selected PDP via a
XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery (9).
The PDP is the most important component of our
security infrastructure. It finally decides whether a user
is allowed to access a given resource or not. It there-
fore retrieves the policy of the requested resource via a
XACMLPolicyQuery (10) from the PAP, which returns it in
form of a XACMLPolicyStatement (11). Hence, (10) and
(11) are identical to (1) and (2) respectively.
To finally reach an authorization decision, several entity,
subject, resource, action, and environment attributes may
be required. As the XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery only
contains the required user attributes, the PDP queries the PIP for
the missing entity, resource, action, and environment attributes
via an SAMLAttributeQuery (12). Similar to (3), there
may be different naming schemes for the missing attributes
which are resolved by the Inference Engine ((13) and (14)).
Finally the PIP returns the required attribute values within a
SAMLAttributeStatement (15).
The PDP now holds all required information to evalu-
ate the access policy and returns the resulting authoriza-
tion decision back to the Access Requester in form of a
XACMLAuthzDecisionStatment (16).
The Access Requester finally embeds the received XACML-
AuthzDecisionStatment into the SOAP header of the
resource request message and delivers it to the Resource ((17a)
and (17b)). More generally, the PEP is an application-specific
software component that is physically enforcing access control
to a resource. The PDP intercepts all communication with
the protected service, analyses the embedded XACMLAuthz-
DecisionStatment, and according to its content, permits
or denies access to the protected service. The Resource finally
does not have to care about security, authentication and access
control as these functions are performed by the PEP, that is
put in front of it. The Resource simply returns the results of
its business logic back to the Access Requester ((18)) which
in (19) presents the result to the user.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In the Access-eGov public service pilot case, we focused
on implementing the necessary core components as depicted
in Fig. 1 and substituted module functionality as needed.
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Fig. 1. Security Architecture in Access-eGov
The Access-eGov service landscape consists of several dozen
public community administrations offering administrative (web)
services around the life event ”registering for marriage” and has
been set up in collaboration with the German State Government
of Schleswig-Holstein and its Ministry of Finance in Kiel.
In our fictitious case presented here, the resource
whose functionality shall be protected against misuse,
is the reservation web service of a sight-seeing boat
which can be booked for the marriage ceremony and
the related function. The ”LoveBoatKiel” web service of-
fers the functions reserveForMarriageFunction and
reserveOptionalCaptainsDinner to allow for an op-
tional captain’s dinner as well. In order not to distract the
reader with legal peculiarities of marrying in Germany, we
simply assume the web service is only requesting the booking
person to prove being of legal age (i.e. to indirectly prove
he/she can book the boat for his/her own marriage function)
before a reservation can be carried out.
A. Realizing XAMCL Entities as Web Services for Loose
Coupling
In addition to the service landscape that was already
present across the Access-eGov small public service world,
the before-mentioned XACML modules PIP, PDP and PAP
were implemented as separate web service components which
are capable of being deployed independently from one another.
This way, the security components can be brokered just as
other functional services across the public service network.
The only exception to this service-oriented paradigm in our
implementation is the PEP, which is transparently placed in
front of the respective service provider. In order to guard the
LoveBoatKiel service with a PEP, the PEP is simply put in
front of the marriage reservation service via a SOAP message
handler chain that is configured locally at service provider. This
reduces the integration of access control to an administrative
minimum and there is no further need for the servicing resource
to know more about security.
The SOAP request with the access token in its message
header and the functional parameter in its body, is handed over
to the web service resource (see (17a) in Fig. 1).
This way, when requesting the protected resource, a chain
of services is being called prior to the actual web service, with
the PEP expecting an access token issued to grant access to
the service and wrapped in the header of the incoming SOAP
messages.
The web service method reserveForMarriage-
Function is only executed when the SOAP handler chain
does not block, i.e. the PEP accepts the access token of the
Access Requester and hands over the data flow to the actual
web service resource (see (17b) in Fig. 1). A SOAP message
is generated with a reservation number to acknowledge receipt
for the marriage function planning (see (18) in Fig. 1). In case
the web service resource is accessed fraudulently or directly
(without any access token at all in the SOAP header), the
handler chain blocks further execution just at the PEP and
forces the local SOAP messaging stack to reply with an error
code accordingly.
B. Data Exchange between XACML Web Service Instances
Context Syntax is used in order to describe the language
constructs for XACML Request and Response Contexts, i.e.
data container formats for authorization requests and decision
statements.
An XACML Request Context is a data container
that an Access Requester builds to send it as
XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery to the PDP. Each one
of the four elements subject, resource, action and
environment is optional, with every single one being
solely defined by its attributes. Thus, a resource is not only
presented by its actual URI, but the URI is one of many
attributes specifying the resource. An attribute therefore can
be any quality of an entity that can be described using XML.
In our implementation the Request Context only contains user
attributes (i.e. element subject) that a PDP may need to come
to an authorization decision. The PDP retrieves all remaining
attributes directly from the PIP.
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C. Integration into the Access-eGov Platform
In detail, an exemplary data flow through the implemented
security architecture starts at the user client, in Access-eGov a
special portal application called ”Personal Assistant Client”,
which has been publicly tested in early 2009 and is playing
the role of the Access Requester as mentioned in chapter III-A.
We assume a user has already electronically registered for
marriage at a registrar’s office in Kiel and is now opting for
the captain’s own optional service in order to reserve the boat
as marriage venue. The Personal Assistant Client as Access
Requester has been made aware of the access restriction to
the LoveBoatKiel service and is now triggering the depicted
security activities chain to obtain an access token for the web
service to make a reservation.
Depending on the requester attributes that a service requires
from a service user, the Personal Assistant Client asks the PIP
to retrieve some or all suitable user attributes from the user’s
attribute repository on behalf of the service requester.
In our case, the PIP is part of the user management system
with access to the user accounts, where all attributes are stored.
The PIP returns SAML-compliant attributes, e.g. the user
attribute values for legal age (see Listing 1) after successful
authentication with the user’s own Access-eGov platform SSO-
credentials.
1<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
2 <S:Body>
3 <ns2:PIPAttributeResponse
4 xmlns:ns2="http://pip.security.accessegov.org/">
5 <ns2:Attribute AttributeId="urn:accessegov:attribute:legal-age"
6 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
7 IssueInstant="2009-04-17T11:40:45-05:00"
8 Issuer="City_of_Kiel">
9 <AttributeValue>true</AttributeValue>
10 </ns2:Attribute>
11 </ns2:PIPAttributeResponse>
12 </S:Body>
13</S:Envelope>
Listing 1. SAML attribute statement expressing legal age
The legal Age attribute was used in this scenario to
guarantee that the target resource is basically protected against
misuse by unintended service requesters. But other more
meaningful attribute types can also be envisioned (e.g. user
group attributes allowing access with certain membership
entitlement only, etc.).
D. Semantically enhanced Integration of Security Services
Security services in a SSOA can, due to the flexibility of the
underlying platform, be integrated using a number of different
approaches of which we will describe a selection of the most
important ones. The choreography – specified according to
the Access-eGov process model – of the LoveBoatKiel web
service as shown in Listing 2 serves as the basis, on which
we will describe the different methods. This code conveys the
following information:
• Variables
?input and ?output are defined to be shared variables
during execution.
• Perform receive
Instructs the platform to expect a semantic object of type
LoveBoatServiceInput as the input to the service
(modeling is always done from the service’s point of view).
Furthermore defines the URI at which the web service is
reachable (aeg#endpointGrounding) and the lifting
and lowering schemes of SAWSDL (see section II-B3).
• Perform send
Instructs the platform to generate a LoveBoatServiceOut-
put semantic object and bind it to the variable ?output.
1webService LoveBoatService
2[...]
3interface LoveBoatServiceInterface
4 choreography LoveBoatServiceChoreography
5 sharedVariables { ?input, ?output}
6 transitionRules
7 perform receive ?input memberOf LoveBoatServiceInput.
8 nfp
9 aeg#endpointGrounding hasValue
10 _grounding("http://localhost:9998/alb/LoveBoatService?wsdl")
11 sawsdl#loweringSchemaMapping hasValue
12 _iri("http://localhost:8080/LoveBoatService_Lowering.xslt")
13 sawsdl#liftingSchemaMapping hasValue
14 _iri("http://localhost:8080/LoveBoatService__Lifting.xslt")
15 endnfp
16 perform send ?output memberOf LoveBoatServiceOutput.
17 nfp
18 endnfp
Listing 2. WSML code of an example web service
We can currently conceive of four architectural options
for realizing such a security architecture for web services,
namely static service authorization, and three fully semantic
authorization types either through a sub-goal, through a Life
Event or through modeling the XACML architecture. We
implemented the static approach in the first place and will
furthermore enhance this implementation applying the approach
to ”Full semantic Authorization through a sub-goal”.
Static Service Authorization (SSA) is the most basic form of
integrating security into a SSOA. It does not involve any form of
semantic matching but features a binding to a service statically
defined at annotation time. When implementing this approach,
the interface in Listing 2 is prepended with an additional
perform receive block constructed like the one on lines
9 - 14 and featuring a grounding to an authorization web
service. Additionally a new variable has to be introduced to
carry the security token:
1) Lowering (Authorization)
The platform instantiates a semantic object comprising all
necessary information to feed the authorization process
shown in chapter III. An XSL transformation serializes
this still semantic object and injects the required con-
stituents into a SOAP message directed at the annotated
web service.
2) Lifting (Authorization)
The authorization step is performed and if the outcome
of the decision is positive, the service returns a SAML
token in the resulting SOAP message.
3) Mediation
Due to peculiarities of the used Access-eGov platform,
passing data from one invocation of a service to an
invocation of another service involves an Access-eGov
specific, so-called ppMediator which transports the
variables between service invocations.
4) Lowering (Requesting service)
Like the previous lowering step, the SAML token is
injected into the SOAP header.
5) Lifting (Requesting service)
This step transforms the web service output (in our case
the result of the boat reservation order) back into the
226
semantic domain by extracting data from the response
and instantiating new semantic objects.
As laid out in the previous chapter, the semantically enriched
service-oriented security architecture can be deployed in
separate self-contained modules within Access-eGov. Those
modules are offering their respective functionality in accordance
with the XACML standard for attribute based access control.
V. FUTURE WORK
So far we only implemented the Static Service Authorization
approach as the closest for semantic enhancement.
Ignoring the other architectural approaches to a semantic
security architecture for web services, there are still a number
of future actions that are worth examining, like the use of
XMLSignatures. However, digital signature especially of the
XACMLAuthzDecisionStatments from the PDP which contain
the Request and Response Contexts is required for real-world
application. For future versions of our implementation this will
be dealt with by either employing SUN’s WSIT or Apache’s
Rampart which allow for easy integration of WS-Security
related capabilities such as XMLSignature and XMLEncryption.
Also, the current implementation as described herein is still
making use of an optional 3rd party SAML-XACML-binding
profile. In the meantime, this binding has already been
integrated into the latest version of the OpenSAML-API.
Another field for future research activity is the semantic
layer of our implementation. All semantic annotations have
been manually coded in WSML due to a lack of fully
automated tools to support this activity, although a basic editor
already exists. More relevant for the security aspect of our
approach is the lack of any ontology for security constructs.
Up to now, there is no sufficient ontology, or even controlled
vocabulary of security terms publicly available for use in
semantic access control systems for web services. For instance,
authorization capabilities could then be described using a
security ontology, with the authorization web services being
semantically annotated for real-time service brokering. This
will be a research topic of paramount nature to research into.
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